The Changing Face of Terrorism and the Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations by Keenan, Patrick J.
Indiana Law Journal 
Volume 95 Issue 3 Article 4 
Summer 2020 
The Changing Face of Terrorism and the Designation of Foreign 
Terrorist Organizations 
Patrick J. Keenan 
University of Illinois College of Law, pjkeenan@illinois.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj 
 Part of the Election Law Commons, International Humanitarian Law Commons, International Law 
Commons, National Security Law Commons, and the Organizations Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Keenan, Patrick J. (2020) "The Changing Face of Terrorism and the Designation of Foreign Terrorist 
Organizations," Indiana Law Journal: Vol. 95 : Iss. 3 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol95/iss3/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by 
the Law School Journals at Digital Repository @ Maurer 
Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Indiana Law 
Journal by an authorized editor of Digital Repository @ 
Maurer Law. For more information, please contact 
rvaughan@indiana.edu. 
 The Changing Face of Terrorism and the Designation of 
Foreign Terrorist Organizations  
PATRICK J. KEENAN* 
CONTENTS 
INTRODUCTION ...................................................................................................... 789 
I. THE PROBLEM: NEW ATTACKS AND NEW ATTACKERS ................................... 796 
A. Attacks on U.S. Elections ..................................................................... 796 
B. Attacks on Critical Infrastructure ........................................................ 799 
II. FTO DESIGNATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT ............ 800 
A. FTO Designation in U.S. Policy .......................................................... 801 
B. The Law of FTO Designation .............................................................. 805 
1. Designation Process ...................................................................... 805 
2. Legal Consequences of Designation ............................................. 807 
III. APPLYING FTO DESIGNATION TO THE NEW ATTACKS ................................... 808 
A. The Nature of an Organization Under the Statute ............................... 810 
B. Threat to U.S. National Security .......................................................... 814 
C. Defining Terrorism .............................................................................. 817 
CONCLUSION .......................................................................................................... 819 
INTRODUCTION 
There is a new kind of conflict taking place that targets physical, social, and political 
infrastructure. The most prominent example, but far from the only one, is well known 
to most Americans. In 2016, Russian operatives and others attempted to interfere 
with the elections in the United States.1 This led to the appointment of Robert S. 
Mueller as Special Counsel for the U.S. Department of Justice to investigate the 
 
 
 * I am grateful to Andy Leipold and Verity Winship for their helpful comments and 
conversations. 
 1. See, e.g., RENEE DIRESTA, KRIS SHAFFER, BECKY RUPPEL, DAVID SULLIVAN, ROBERT 
MATNEY, RYAN FOX, JONATHAN ALBRIGHT & BEN JOHNSON, NEW KNOWLEDGE, THE TACTICS 
AND TROPES OF THE INTERNET RESEARCH AGENCY 4 (2018) (describing, based on analysis of 
the social media data disclosed to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, the ways that 
Russia and its operatives interfered in the 2016 U.S. elections); OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L 
INTELLIGENCE, ASSESSING RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND INTENTIONS IN RECENT US ELECTIONS 1 
(2017) (finding that “Putin and the Russian Government aspired to help [candidate] Trump’s 
election chances when possible by discrediting [candidate] Clinton”); SENATE SELECT COMM. 
ON INTELLIGENCE, 115TH CONG., RUSSIAN TARGETING OF ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE DURING 
THE 2016 ELECTION: SUMMARY OF INITIAL FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS (2018), 
https://www.intelligence.senate.gov/publications/russia-inquiry [https://perma.cc/7TA3-
UVFR] (describing attempts to hack or otherwise penetrate U.S. election infrastructure); Scott 
Shane & Mark Mazzetti, The Plot to Subvert an Election: Unraveling the Russia Story So Far, 
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2018/09/20/us/politics 
/russia-interference-election-trump-clinton.html [https://perma.cc/S86D-5QW6] (finding, 
based on comprehensive reporting, that “Russians carried out a landmark intervention” in the 
U.S. elections). 
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alleged interference,2 and provoked thousands of news reports.3 The flood of stories 
about Russian interference in the 2016 U.S. elections threatens to obscure other 
attacks that are perhaps even more serious, and for which the United States is equally 
poorly prepared.4 In March 2018, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the 
F.B.I. issued a technical alert about a large, “multi-stage intrusion campaign” 
launched by the Russian government against targets in the U.S. energy sector, 
including nuclear, commercial, and aviation facilities.5 If the full threat of the attack 
materializes, Russia and its operatives could wreak havoc on large swaths of the U.S. 
power grid, including hospitals, sensitive aviation facilities, and dams. Russia 
launched similar attacks in Ukraine in 2015 and disabled that country's electric grid.6 
Russia also tested attacks against commercial actors in Ukraine whose operations 
were essential to the functioning of that country's economy and governance.7 As 
significant as it was, Russia's interference with the 2016 election was not nearly as 
deadly as these other potential attacks could become.8 All of these attacks and threats 
 
 
 2. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., DEP’T OF JUSTICE, APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL 
COUNSEL TO INVESTIGATE RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE WITH THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION 
AND RELATED MATTERS, ORDER NO. 3915-2017 (2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-
release/file/967231/download [https://perma.cc/FL9U-BW3R].  
 3. For a comprehensive guide to the various stories, see Mount Holyoke College, Trump 
Presidency: Election, Transition, and Administration, MOUNT HOLYOKE LIBR. RES. GUIDES, 
http://guides.mtholyoke.edu/trump [https://perma.cc/X3F3-E9Y8]. The research guide brings 
together the relevant documents, news feeds, and other sources. 
 4. See, e.g., Rebecca Smith, U.S. Officials Push New Penalties for Hackers of Electrical 
Grid, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-officials-push-new              
-penalties-for-hackers-of-electrical-grid-1533492714 [https://perma.cc/RZD6-VQCE]. 
(describing attempts by U.S. law enforcement agencies to increase protections of critical 
infrastructure against cyberattacks); Arthur H. House, Opinion, We’d Be Crippled by a 
Cyberattack on Our Utilities, WASH. POST. (Oct. 14, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com 
/opinions/wed-be-crippled-by-a-cyberattack-on-our-utilities/2018/10/14/206b0dc6-cca8-11e 
8-a360-85875bac0b1f_story.html [https://perma.cc/T3TS-LVGM]. 
 5. See NATI’L CYBERSECURITY AND COMMC’NS INTEGRATION CTR., U.S. DEP’T OF 
HOMELAND SEC., RUSSIAN GOVERNMENT CYBER ACTIVITY TARGETING ENERGY AND OTHER 
CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE SECTORS (2018), https://www.us-cert.gov/ncas/alerts/TA18-074A 
[https://perma.cc/WJJ7-55FM] (describing “a multi-stage intrusion campaign by Russian 
government cyber actors” against U.S. infrastructure). 
 6. Kim Zetter, Inside the Cunning, Unprecedented Hack of Ukraine's Power Grid, 
WIRED (Mar. 3, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/03/inside-cunning-unprecedented-hack-
ukraines-power-grid/ [https://perma.cc/637V-8NE2] (describing coordinated attack on power 
grid that disabled power to approximately 225,000 people).  
 7. See, e.g., Andrew E. Kramer, Ukraine Cyberattack Was Meant to Paralyze, not Profit, 
Evidence Shows, N.Y. TIMES (June 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/06/28/world 
/europe/ukraine-ransomware-cyberbomb-accountants-russia.html [https://perma.cc/ZG5Z-
Y3XS] (describing Russian-directed cyberattack on Ukrainian computer systems and critical 
infrastructure). 
 8. See, e.g., Rob Knake, The Next Cyber Battleground: Defending the U.S. Power Grid 
from Russian Hackers, FOREIGN AFF. (July 19, 2018), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles 
/north-america/2018-07-19/next-cyber-battleground [https://perma.cc/AHH7-C7N5] 
(describing potential impacts of cyberattack on U.S. power grid). 
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represent variations of a new and potentially devastating type of conflict for which 
U.S. law is unprepared. 
These attacks are new for two principal reasons: the kind of attack is different 
from what has come before; and the attacker is a combination of participants, 
including state and nonstate actors, witting and unwitting contributors, and civilian 
and military personnel. These differences are particularly important because the legal 
tools available to law enforcement personnel have not caught up with the changes on 
the ground. Many of the attacks rely principally on cyber tools and have as their aim 
not to kill their enemies quickly but to sow political, social, or economic uncertainty 
and discord. The objective is destabilization and the means include both potentially 
violent and nonviolent means. And the attacks are different for a second reason: the 
kind of attacker is new. The apparent wrongdoers are not states, political parties with 
a military wing, or quasi-states.9 Instead, they are a collection of like-minded 
individuals with some connections to each other and to a state, but not wholly a part 
of it. And they rely in large part on their ability to mobilize at least some unwitting 
civilian participants to inflict harms. As terrorism evolves, the time is right for a 
reexamination of available law enforcement tools to determine how to best address 
these attacks.  
For prosecutors putting together cases against suspected terrorists, one of the most 
important tools of counterterrorism has been the designation of terrorist groups as 
foreign terrorist organizations.10 Doing this requires the Secretary of State to 
assemble a dossier of information about the organization to determine that it is a 
foreign organization that engages in terrorist activity that threatens the national 
security of the United States.11 One of the consequences of such a designation is that 
prosecutors can easily target for prosecution supporters of designated organizations. 
There are two statutes that make it a crime to provide material support to terrorist 
organizations. One targets those who provide support for crimes that a terrorist 
commits or may be planning to commit.12 The other targets those who provide 
support for designated terrorist organizations. This second material support statute 
allows prosecutors to obtain a conviction or use the threat of prosecution to secure 
cooperation, even if the defendant is unaware of any specific attack or plan or the 
 
 
 9. To be clear, I do not argue that the new terrorist threat is completely unprecedented. 
Instead, I argue that it represents a departure from the presumed type of organization against 
which U.S. legal tools have been mobilized. For a brief history of terrorism and terrorist 
groups, see generally WALTER ENDERS & TODD SANDLER, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
TERRORISM 14–20 (2006) (describing varieties of terrorist groups from 19th century through 
contemporary groups).  
 10. For a thorough analysis of the designation of foreign terrorist organizations and the 
implications of designation for organizations and individuals associated with them, see 
generally Wadie E. Said, The Material Support Prosecution and Foreign Policy, 86 IND. L.J. 
543, 558–76 (2011).  
 11. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 8 U.S.C. § 
1189(a)(1)(A)–(C) (2012).   
 12. AEDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (2012) (criminalizing the provision of support knowing 
that it will be “used in preparation for, or in carrying out” a terrorist act). For a description of 
the operation of the statute, see CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41333, TERRORIST 
MATERIAL SUPPORT: AN OVERVIEW OF 18 U.S.C. 2339 § A AND 2339 § B 2–12 (2016).  
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organization is not at that time planning a specific attack.13 This allows law 
enforcement and counterterrorism personnel to act sooner than might otherwise be 
possible and leverage early-level cooperation to obtain information about other 
participants. For example, prosecutors are able to obtain a conviction before a 
terrorist act is carried out or even planned.14   
In this Article, I take up one slice of what should be a broad re-examination of 
U.S. law and policy. I argue that the new attacks have been undertaken by entities 
that can and should be designated as foreign terrorist organizations. Doing this would 
permit prosecutors to target those who support these entities with tools that are not 
currently available. This Article is both a doctrinal argument that directly addresses 
the many legal hurdles that make designating groups, such as foreign hackers and 
troll farms, terrorist organizations a complicated endeavor, and a policy argument 
about how U.S. law and policy should respond to new modes of terrorism.  
To make this case, I make two principal claims. First, on the doctrinal front, I 
argue that my proposed reconsideration of the kinds of entities that may be 
designated as terrorist organizations is consistent with existing law and with the 
purposes of 8 U.S.C. § 1189, the statute permitting designation. Making this case 
requires consideration of what it means for an entity to be an “organization,” what 
activities constitute terrorism, and how this activity is similar to activity that is 
currently considered terrorism. Although the context is different, new organizations 
have similar structures and characteristics as organizations that have been designated 
already.15 With respect to what constitutes terrorism, I argue that a harms-based 
approach is appropriate. The magnitude and type of harm done by the new 
organizations are similar to harm done by existing organizations.16 Second, on the 
policy side, I argue that the problem of the entities that are threatening U.S. 
economic, governmental, and social infrastructure can be more effectively addressed 
if they are designated as terrorist organizations. Despite the attention paid to 
counterterrorism law and policy in the past two decades, the area of law is far from 
fully developed and has struggled to keep up with changes in the world. Designating 
these entities as foreign terrorist organizations would amount to an updating of law 
and policy to better combat an evolving threat.  
Before moving on, a brief detour is in order to explain how the law can 
accommodate itself to novel or evolving issues. The law always struggles to catch 
up to current events. Legal institutions are conservative, relying on precedent to reach 
predictable results.17 But events move quickly and sometimes the law must quickly 
evolve. International criminal law and its close relative international humanitarian 
 
 
 13. AEDPA, 18 U.S.C. § 2339B; see also DOYLE, supra note 12 (describing differences 
between two material support statutes). 
 14. See, e.g., United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 47–49 (2013) (denying defendant’s 
argument on appeal that a material support conviction could not rest on his translation of 
potentially incendiary materials and posting the translations online). 
 15. See infra Section III.A. 
 16. See infra Section III.A. 
 17. For a full theory of legal change, see generally Oona A. Hathaway, Path Dependence 
in the Law: The Course and Pattern of Legal Change in a Common Law System, 86 IOWA L. 
REV. 601 (2001). Hathaway argues that legal evolution is inevitably, and powerfully, 
connected to past decisions, which can slow the process of change and determine its course. 
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law have developed in response to events, many of which were unanticipated and 
seemingly beyond the reach of the law to address.18 To be clear, I do not argue that 
it is possible, or even desirable, to identify convenient principles of international 
criminal law and import them wholesale into the application of U.S. domestic 
counterterrorism law. There are significant differences between the two areas of law 
that militate against that approach.19 Instead, I argue that international criminal law 
has confronted this problem—a poor fit between new problems and old principles of 
law—and developed the interpretive means by which to address them. 
The horrors of the Holocaust were a principal catalyst for the development of the 
crime of genocide, and the Nuremberg prosecutions for these crimes were the first 
formal application of the prohibition of crimes against humanity.20 More recently, 
when armed groups in Sierra Leone began the practice of forcing young women into 
conjugal relationships with fighters, including labeling the young women as their 
“wives,” international criminal law had the doctrinal space to include this behavior 
as a separate crime against humanity.21 The evolution of international criminal law 
and international humanitarian law takes place within well-known constraints, 
however. Chief among them is the legality principle, also known as nullum crimen 
sine lege, which permits prosecution only if the allegedly criminal activity was 
defined as a crime and those who engaged in the substantive conduct were subject to 
individual criminal prosecution at the time the conduct occurred.22 
In addition to this formal limitation, the law has evolved principles for reasoning 
by analogy that could be usefully applied to any decision to designate a new terrorist 
entity as a foreign terrorist organization. One example to look for is the rough 
equivalence of harms or rights. For example, when determining if some conduct can 
 
 
 18. One prominent example is the ways that international criminal law has addressed 
crimes of sexual violence. For a comprehensive treatment of the changing ways that rape under 
international law, see generally Phillip Weiner, The Evolving Jurisprudence of the Crime of 
Rape in International Criminal Law, 54 B.C. L. REV. 1207 (2013).  
 19. See generally Hari M. Osofsky, Note, Domesticating International Criminal Law: 
Bringing Human Rights Violators to Justice, 107 YALE L.J. 191 (1997) (analyzing areas of 
difference and convergence between international criminal law and domestic legal systems). 
 20. See generally Egon Schwelb, Crimes Against Humanity, 23 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 178 
(1946) (describing the doctrinal history of crimes against humanity and the crime of genocide). 
 21. Prosecutor v. Brima, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 187–96 (Feb. 22, 
2008). The Appeals Chamber held that even if “forced marriage shares certain elements with 
sexual slavery . . . there are also distinguishing factors,” which included a consideration of the 
different harms associated with each offense. Id. ¶ 195. Importantly, the Appeals Chamber 
concluded that the harms associated with each offense were both distinct from each other—
meaning that each crime was capturing some aspect of harm not captured by the other—and 
of similar magnitude. Id. ¶¶ 199–201. 
 22. STEVEN R. RATNER, JASON S. ABRAMS & JAMES L. BISCHOFF, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR 
HUMAN RIGHTS ATROCITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 23–24 (3rd ed., 2009) (describing 
contours of the legality principle). For a comprehensive argument regarding the role the 
legality principle plays in the development of international criminal law, see generally 
Mohamed Shahabuddeen, Does the Principle of Legality Stand in the Way of Progressive 
Development of Law?, 2 J. INT'L CRIM. JUST. 1007 (2004). Shahabuddeen argues that, if the 
elements of new crimes are constructed in a way that comports with established crimes, the 
legality principle need not block the evolution of the law. Id. at 1014. 
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be prosecuted as an international crime, courts often attempt to determine if the 
harms caused by the underlying conduct are roughly equivalent to the harms caused 
by existing, accepted crimes.23 Further, courts sometimes attempt to determine if the 
nature of the right violated by the underlying conduct, such as the right to life or the 
right to be free from arbitrary arrest, is roughly equivalent to the rights protected by 
existing, accepted crimes.24  
To illustrate this approach, consider the prosecution of several leaders of one of 
the armed factions in Sierra Leone. They were charged with the crime of forced 
marriage, among other things.25 In the prolonged violence in Sierra Leone, fighters 
from all sides abused women in myriad ways.26 During and after the conflict there 
was ample evidence of rape and other sexual violence, sexual slavery, kidnapping, 
and forced labor.27 The Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) 
permitted the tribunal to try defendants for the crimes against humanity of rape, 
sexual slavery, forced prostitution, forced pregnancy, sexual violence, and torture.28 
All of the actions described above amounted to crimes that would fit squarely into 
existing categories of crimes against humanity.  
This is not the approach that prosecutors pursued. They charged Brima and other 
defendants from the leadership of the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council 
(AFRC)29 with the crime against humanity of “forced marriage.”30 Prosecutors 
alleged that forced marriage was a means by which the defendants committed “other 
 
 
 23. See, e.g., Micaela Frulli, Advancing International Criminal Law: The Special Court 
for Sierra Leone Recognizes Forced Marriage as a ‘New’ Crime Against Humanity, 6 J. INT'L 
CRIM. JUST. 1033, 1037–40 (2008) (arguing that harms must be both distinct from each other 
and comparable in magnitude to support the creation of a new crime in a way that is consistent 
with the legality principle).  
 24. See, e.g., Neha Jain, Forced Marriage as a Crime Against Humanity, 6 J. INT'L CRIM. 
JUST. 1013, 1030–31 (2008) (arguing that the harms associated with each crime must violate 
rights of similar magnitude). 
 25. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further 
Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 51–57 (Feb. 18, 2005) (indicting defendants for the 
crime against humanity of “other inhumane acts,” including “forced marriage”). 
 26. See generally LOUISE TAYLOR, HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, WE'LL KILL YOU IF YOU CRY: 
SEXUAL VIOLENCE IN THE SIERRA LEONE CONFLICT (2003) (describing, based on interviews 
with survivors and witnesses, sexual violence against women and girls in Sierra Leone during 
the conflict). 
 27. See generally Michelle Staggs Kelsall & Shanee Stepakoff, “When We Wanted to 
Talk About Rape”: Silencing Sexual Violence at the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 1 INT'L J. 
TRANSITIONAL JUST. 355 (2007) (describing extent of sexual violence in conflict in Sierra 
Leone and experiences of survivors who were prepared to testify about it). 
 28. Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone arts. 2–4, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
145, (detailing the powers of the SCSL, including the ability to prosecute crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, and other serious violations respectively). 
 29. The AFRC was one of several organized armed groups fighting in Sierra Leone. See 
generally Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Further 
Amended Consolidated Indictment, ¶¶ 7–17 (describing combatant parties in conflict in Sierra 
Leone). 
 30. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶ 175 
(Feb. 22, 2008). 
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inhumane acts,” a crime in the statute.31 And prosecutors sought convictions even 
when they were prosecuting the defendants for most of the same underlying violent 
conduct against the same victims.32 Prosecutors took the approach they did not 
because there was insufficient evidence of those other crimes—rape, kidnaping, and 
so forth—but because those crimes did not precisely capture the unique nature of the 
harms done to women who were forced into “marriages” with their captors and 
abusers.33  
In Brima, prosecutors maintained that this was appropriate because one of the 
purposes of the tribunal was to address as many of the most substantial harms as 
possible.34 I argue that this move was significant for another reason, the legal strategy 
the prosecutors chose when justifying their charging decision.35 When they were 
charging and justifying the crime of forced marriage, they started by using existing 
doctrinal space. They showed that the new crime addressed harms that were of 
equivalent weight to the harms addressed by other crimes in the same category but 
that the harms covered by the new crime were not otherwise addressed.36 There was 
no crime that addressed the harms that flowed from forced conjugal association, for 
example.37 Finally, they showed that the elements of the new crime were not 
themselves novel.38 Put differently, prosecutors argued, and the tribunal concluded, 
that even if the finished dish was new, the ingredients were familiar and had been 
used before.  
A second important means of permitting the law to evolve in a principled way is 
to look closely at the object and purpose of the law or provision at issue to determine 
if it was created to address that particular kind of behavior. To do this, courts 
typically rely on Article 31 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which 
provides that treaties should be interpreted in light of their “object and purpose.”39 In 
 
 
 31. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 2.i, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 U.N.T.S. 
145, (permitting the prosecution of the crime against humanity of “[o]ther inhumane acts”); 
Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 175–76 
(describing prosecution's decision to charge “forced marriage” as the crime against humanity 
of other inhumane acts). 
 32. Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-A, Judgment, ¶¶ 
187–96 (describing similarities between forced marriage and other crimes of sexual violence). 
 33. See id. ¶¶ 177–78 (describing prosecution arguments that the harms associated with 
forced marriage were different from those associated with other crimes of sexual violence). 
 34. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone art. 1, ¶ 1, Jan. 16, 2002, 2178 
U.N.T.S. 145 (stating that the purpose of the SCSL was to “prosecute persons who bear the 
greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law and Sierra 
Leonean law”). 
 35. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Indictment, 
¶¶ 51–57, (May 13, 2004) (indicting defendants for the crime against humanity of “other 
inhumane acts,” including “forced marriage”). 
 36. See Prosecutor v. Brima, Kamara & Kanu, Case No. SCSL-2004-16-PT, Appeals 
Judgement, ¶¶ 177–78 (Feb. 22, 2008) (describing prosecution arguments that the harms 
associated with forced marriage were different from those associated with other crimes of 
sexual violence). 
 37. See id.  ¶¶ 187–96. 
 38. Id. at ¶¶ 197–98 (finding that the crime did not violate the legality principle). 
 39. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S. 
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practice, this approach has come to mean that courts look for one or two primary 
purposes, which are typically the protection of civilians or an end to impunity for 
wrongdoing, when interpreting international criminal law or applying existing law to 
new situations.40 
I. THE PROBLEM: NEW ATTACKS AND NEW ATTACKERS 
In this Part, I describe the attacks on the 2016 U.S. elections and attempts to attack 
critical infrastructure in Europe and elsewhere. The purpose of this Part is twofold. 
First, by describing the attacks in some detail, I aim to demonstrate that the harms 
they inflicted are similar in magnitude and type to those inflicted in other terrorist 
attacks by groups that have been designed as foreign terrorist organizations. Second, 
this Part helps to show that the available law enforcement tools are inadequate. Taken 
together, this helps to make the case that U.S. policy is confronting a threat that is 
significant and for which the United States is unprepared. 
A. Attacks on U.S. Elections 
The attacks on the 2016 U.S. elections comprised multiple fronts and included a 
number of attackers. In this Section, I describe the broad outlines of what happened 
to show the importance of the attacks and some of their social effects. It is important 
to note that there have been, and continue to be, several overlapping investigations 
into the many ways that Russian entities interfered in U.S. elections. Both chambers 
of the U.S. Congress have undertaken investigations.41 The Attorney General 
appointed Robert Mueller to investigate certain aspects of these activities.42 And 
journalists have doggedly pursued the many tendrils of the story.43 There is, as yet, 
 
 
331 (providing that a “treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary 
meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and 
purpose”). 
 40. See Darryl Robinson, The Identity Crisis of International Criminal Law, 21 LEIDEN J. 
INT'L L. 925, 935–36 (2008) (describing the purposes that courts identify when interpreting 
international criminal law statutes). 
 41. See, e.g., David E. Sanger & Catie Edmondson, Russia Targeted Election Systems in 
All 50 States, Report Finds, N.Y. TIMES (July 24, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/07/25 
/us/politics/russian-hacking-elections.html [https://perma.cc/WEB4-LT7P] (reporting results 
of Senate investigation into Russian interference in U.S. elections); Charlie Savage & Matthew 
Rosenberg, Five Takeaways from the House Report on Russian Election Meddling, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 27, 2018),  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/27/us/politics/takeaways-house-
intelligence-committee-russian-election-interference.html [https://perma.cc/Y355-TZ3S] 
(describing results of the investigation undertaken by the House of Representatives into 
Russian interference in U.S. elections).  
 42. OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GEN., supra note 2. 
 43. Reporting on Russia's role in the 2016 elections has been extensive. For just one 
example, see generally MICHAEL ISIKOFF & DAVID CORN, RUSSIAN ROULETTE: THE INSIDE 
STORY OF PUTIN'S WAR ON AMERICA AND THE ELECTION OF DONALD TRUMP (2018) (describing 
aspects of Russia's interference in the 2016 U.S. elections).  
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no complete, authoritative history of the problem.44 Nonetheless, it is important to 
describe what is known at this point.  
There were three basic prongs of the attacks on the U.S. electoral processes: a 
social influence campaign, an attack on the Democratic National Committee's 
database, and a series of attempts to gain access to state electoral system databases.45 
In the assessment of the U.S. intelligence community, the social influence campaign 
was ordered by Russian President Vladimir Putin46 and carried out by individuals 
and organizations affiliated with Russia's Internet Research Agency.47 The goal was 
to push voters toward candidate Donald Trump and away from candidate Hillary 
Clinton.48 The consequences of this effort were to exacerbate existing social tensions 
and reduce voter turnout based on false claims.49 The social influence campaign had 
several facets, all based on the goal of bolstering candidate Trump and harming the 
prospects of candidate Clinton.50 Indeed, the U.S. intelligence community concluded 
that “Putin, his advisers, and the Russian Government developed a clear preference 
for . . . Trump over . . . Clinton.”51 One component of Russia's interference was a 
concerted attempt to suppress the number of African-American voters through social 
media messages suggesting that voting was futile or that neither candidate would 
address issues important to many African Americans.52 Another part of the campaign 
 
 
 44. The report issued by Robert S. Mueller is likely the most comprehensive treatment of 
the subject. See generally 1–2 ROBERT S. MUELLER III, REPORT ON THE INVESTIGATION INTO 
RUSSIAN INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION (2019), https://www.justice.gov 
/storage/report.pdf [https://perma.cc/T2H8-8ZJJ].  
 45. DIRESTA ET AL., supra note 1. In this Part, I rely heavily on the report from New 
Knowledge, an analytics firm contracted by the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence 
(SSCI), analyzing all of the social media turned over to the SSCI in its investigation into 
Russian interference in the U.S. elections and other attempts to attack U.S. electoral processes. 
Id. at 3. The report is based on tens of millions of posts, tweets, videos, and other electronic 
engagements (collectively engaged with approximately 337 million times) turned over to the 
SSCI by Facebook, Google, Instagram, YouTube, and other companies. Id. at 7. The report’s 
findings do not represent official U.S. government findings, id. at 3, but they are based on the 
most comprehensive dataset publicly available. 
 46. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1 (noting that the intelligence 
community “assess[ed] with high confidence that Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered 
an influence campaign in 2016 aimed at the US presidential election”).  
 47. See generally Indictment at ¶¶ 1–24, United States v. Internet Research Agency LLC 
(D.D.C. filed Feb. 16, 2018) (No. 1:18-cr-0032-DLF) (describing web of organizations and 
individuals who allegedly worked together to interfere in U.S. elections). 
 48. DIRESTA ET AL., supra note 1.  
 49. See PHILIP N. HOWARD, BHARATH GANESH, DIMITRA LIOTSIOU, JOHN KELLY & 
CAMILLE FRANÇOIS, THE IRA, SOCIAL MEDIA AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES, 2012-2018 at 17–20 (2018) (describing Russia’s attempts to polarize the U.S. public 
through misinformation during the 2016 elections). 
 50. DIRESTA ET AL., supra note 1, at 9 (describing Russia’s attempts to benefit candidate 
Trump and harm candidate Clinton). 
 51. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1.  
 52. See, e.g., Scott Shane & Sheera Frenkel, Russian 2016 Influence Operation Targeted 
African-Americans on Social Media, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 17, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/12/17/us/politics/russia-2016-influence-campaign.html [https://perma.cc/KFU8-
TK7N] (describing campaign by Internet Research Agency to suppress the turnout of African-
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attempted to bolster the case for candidate Trump by, among other things, spreading 
false but inflammatory stories designed to appeal to right-wing voters and by 
encouraging those on the extreme right to become more engaged.53 Data from U.S. 
social media companies showed that those involved in the campaign worked their 
way into online chatrooms to connect with Americans who already held extreme 
views to steer them either toward candidate Trump or away from voting at all.54  
The second prong was the coordinated attack on the Democratic National 
Committee’s database and the subsequent release of data related to the Hillary 
Clinton campaign.55 Using an identity that was falsely identified as an independent 
Romanian hacker, the Russian-led effort obtained personal email information from 
U.S. political operatives.56 The hackers sent emails to members of the Clinton 
campaign to obtain their confidential login information.57 They used this information 
to gain access to the entire network of the Democratic National Committee, obtaining 
information about election strategy and other matters. The hackers then shared this 
information with intermediaries who ensured that it would be posted on WikiLeaks 
and other websites, thus making it public.58 The release of the information was also 
timed to do as much damage as possible to candidate Clinton over as long a time 
period as possible.59 
The third prong involved attempts to gain access to state electoral system 
databases, including voter registration data.60 Elements of the same organization that 
 
 
American voters); see also PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 40, at 3 (finding, based on 
data provided to the SSCI, that “Russia’s IRA activities were designed to . . . interfere in 
elections by . . . campaigning for African American voters to boycott elections or follow wrong 
voting procedures”). 
 53. PHILIP N. HOWARD ET AL., supra note 49, at 3. 
 54. See id. at 39 (finding that the Russian social influence campaign “used a variety of 
fake accounts to infiltrate political discussion communities on the right and left . . . in order to 
exacerbate social divisions and influence the agenda”).   
 55. DIRESTA ET AL., supra note 1; OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 
1, at 1–2. The United States indicted twelve individuals, charging them with participating in 
the hacking operation. Indictment at ¶¶ 22–31, United States v. Netyksho (D.D.C. filed July 
13, 2018) (No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ) (describing means by which the defendants allegedly 
gained illegal access to databases belonging to the Democratic National Committee). 
 56. Ellen Nakashima & Shane Harris, How the Russians Hacked the DNC and Passed Its 
Emails to WikiLeaks, WASH. POST (July 13, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world 
/national-security/how-the-russians-hacked-the-dnc-and-passed-its-emails-to-wikileaks/2018 
/07/13/af19a828-86c3-11e8-8553-a3ce89036c78_story.html [https://perma.cc/Y9NA-7J6M].  
 57. See Indictment at ¶¶ 21–23, 26–31, United States v. Netyksho (D.D.C. filed July 13, 
2018) (No. 1:18-cr-00215-ABJ) (describing means by which the defendants allegedly 
obtained damaging information from databases of the Democratic National Committee). 
 58. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1, at 12–13 (finding that 
elements of Russia's intelligence directorate “used the Guccifer 2.0 persona, DCLeaks.com, 
and WikiLeaks to release US victim data obtained in cyber operations publicly and in 
exclusives to media outlets”). 
 59. Nakashima & Harris, supra note 56 (reporting that hacked emails were “released on 
WikiLeaks in a steady stream” through 2016, “ensuring that material embarrassing to Clinton's 
campaign would continue on a daily basis to deflect from her message in the weeks leading 
up to the election”). 
 60. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1.  
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engineered the other attacks have consistently attempted to gain access to the 
databases of state election officials.61 These attacks took different forms. Based on 
information provided to the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, a number of 
states observed that their election systems, including voter registration databases, 
were scanned for weaknesses.62 In other states, the attacks went further. The attackers 
were able to penetrate the election infrastructure so deeply that they were in a 
position to “alter or delete voter registration data.”63 In addition, after the 2016 
elections, the hackers appear to have attacked vendors who provide the election 
technology in some states.64 
B. Attacks on Critical Infrastructure 
An increasing focus of Russian-affiliated terrorists is critical infrastructure in the 
United States and Europe.65 The most audacious of these attacks took place in 
December 2015 and targeted the power grid in Ukraine.66 Beginning in the afternoon 
of December 23 and continuing for several hours, seven power substations were 
disconnected and unable to provide power. The outages affected approximately 
225,000 people.67 The attackers even disabled the backup power in two of the 
substations, which meant that officials working to respond to the attack were cut off 
and had no access to power themselves.68 Officials were eventually able to use 
antiquated, manual workarounds to restore power.69 The attackers had laid the 
 
 
 61. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1, at 13 (finding that “Russian 
intelligence accessed elements of state or local electoral boards”).  
 62. U.S. SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, supra note 1, at 1 (reporting that at 
least “18 states had election systems targeted by Russian-affiliated cyber actors” and that this 
behavior included “vulnerability scanning directed at their Secretary of State websites or voter 
registration infrastructure”).  
 63. Id. at 1–2 (reporting that “in a small number of states, these cyber actors were in a 
position to, at a minimum, alter or delete voter registration data” but “they did not appear to 
be in a position to manipulate individual votes or aggregate vote totals”).  
 64. Nicole Perlroth, Michael Wines & Matthew Rosenberg, Russian Election Hacking 
Efforts, Wider Than Previously Known, Draw Little Scrutiny, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 2017), 
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/01/us/politics/russia-election-hacking.html 
[https://perma.cc/P39Y-26M3] (reporting that hackers infiltrated the systems of VR Systems, 
a company providing election technology to states, and other similar companies). 
 65. See, e.g., Nicole Perlroth & David E. Sanger, Cyberattacks Put Russian Fingers on 
the Switch at Power Plants, U.S. Says, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com 
/2018/03/15/us/politics/russia-cyberattacks.html [https://perma.cc/U9JP-MBAH] (reporting 
on Russian attempts to attack power and water facilities in the United States and Europe). 
 66. See Zetter, supra note 6 (reporting steps in the attack on the power grid). 
 67. See ELEC. INFO. SHARING AND ANALYSIS CTR., ANALYSIS OF THE CYBER ATTACK ON 
THE UKRAINIAN POWER GRID iv (2016) (finding, based on extensive technical analysis of the 
attack, that 225,000 customers were affected for several hours). 
 68. Zetter, supra note 6 (reporting that the attacks “disabled backup power supplies to two 
of the three distribution centers, leaving operators themselves stumbling in the dark”). 
 69. Kim Zetter, Everything We Know About Ukraine’s Power Plant Hack, WIRED (Jan. 
20, 2016), https://www.wired.com/2016/01/everything-we-know-about-ukraines-power-
plant-hack/ [https://perma.cc/DLT2-8U9A] (reporting that because Ukraine’s relatively old 
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groundwork for their eventual effort to seize control of the grid through a months-
long phishing campaign in which they obtained the necessary personal credentials to 
gain access to the grid operators’ network.70  
The attack on Ukraine’s power grid was not an isolated incident. In 2017, Russia-
affiliated hackers had perpetrated a cyberattack against a petrochemical plant in 
Saudi Arabia.71 In 2016, hackers affiliated with the Russian government hacked into 
the laptop of an official with an electricity company in Vermont and installed 
malicious code.72 It was not clear to investigators whether the goal was to take over 
the grid or merely to assess its vulnerability for a future operation,73 as had been done 
in the Ukraine case. Indeed, according to U.S. security officials, it appears that 
hackers are increasingly targeting critical infrastructure and focusing less on election 
systems.74  
II. FTO DESIGNATION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT  
One of the cornerstones of U.S. counterterrorism policy has been to deny terrorists 
the resources they need to plan and carry out attacks.75 In this Part, I show how this 
policy has been implemented through a range of mechanisms. The goal is to situate 
the Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) designation process in the larger 
counterterrorism strategy. I then describe the law of FTO designation. Taken 
together, this sets the stage for Part IV, in which I argue that designation of new 
 
 
system still contained manual overrides, it was easier for officials to bring the grid back online 
that would have been possible in a more modern system lacking manual overrides). 
 70. For a thorough technical analysis of all known steps in the attack, see generally ELEC. 
INFO. ANALYSIS CTR., supra note 67, which describes plan that took several months and 
combined a range of hacking techniques to accomplish the goal.   
 71. Dustin Volz, Researches Link Cyberattack on Saudi Petrochemical Plant to Russia, 
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-researchers-link-cyberattack-
on-saudi-petrochemical-plant-to-russia-1540322439 [https://perma.cc/ZPH5-ZFHV] 
(reporting that malicious code was used by hackers to gain control over a critical safety system 
in the plant). 
 72. Juliet Eilperin & Adam Entous, Russian Operation Hacked a Vermont Utility, 
Showing Risk to U.S. Electrical Grid Security, Officials Say, WASH. POST (Dec. 31, 2016), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/russian-hackers-penetrated-us-
electricity-grid-through-a-utility-in-vermont/2016/12/30/8fc90cc4-ceec-11e6-b8a2-8c2a61 
b0436f_story.html [https://perma.cc/ZKJ3-4YKC] (describing hack of Burlington Electric by 
hackers associated with Russia). 
 73. Id. (reporting that “[t]he incursion may have been designed to disrupt the utility’s 
operations or as a test to see whether they could penetrate a portion of the grid”). 
 74. Id.; David E. Sanger, Russian Hackers Appear to Shift Focus to U.S. Power Grid, 
N.Y. TIMES (July 27, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/27/us/politics/russian-
hackers-electric-grid-elections-.html?login=email&auth=login-email [https://perma.cc/4RSJ-
TDFK] (reporting that the Department of Homeland Security found that “Russia’s military 
intelligence agency had infiltrated the control rooms of power plants across the United States,” 
which, in theory, would have given the attackers the power to “take control of parts of the grid 
by remote control”). 
 75. See DOYLE, supra note 12, at 1 (“The two federal material support statutes have been 
at the heart of the Justice Department’s terrorist prosecution efforts”).  
2020] CHANGING FACE OF TERRORISM  801 
 
terrorist groups would be consistent with U.S. policy and that the doctrinal hurdles 
are not insurmountable. 
A. FTO Designation in U.S. Policy 
A recent hallmark of U.S. policy has been to attempt to prevent terrorist attacks 
rather than prosecuting terrorists after the fact. To do this, law enforcement personnel 
must have tools to acquire evidence before an attack is imminent so they can 
intercede and prevent the attack. This has meant a greater focus on the prosecution 
of individuals associated with terror plots or terrorist organizations, even if they play 
ancillary roles in these plots or organizations.76 Prosecutors target individuals who 
do things such as talk about their support for ISIS, undertake weapons training, or 
indicate a desire to travel to Syria.77  
U.S. policy has also focused on cutting off financial support for terrorists, which 
the U.S. government has attempted to do by imposing strict disclosure requirements 
on U.S. financial institutions, requiring foreign financial institutions that do business 
in the U.S. to comply with stricter regulations, and promoting greater sharing of 
financial information.78 This strategy is designed to make it possible for financial 
institutions and law enforcement agencies to identify where funding comes from, 
where it goes, and whom it ultimately benefits, while not unduly restricting the flow 
of legitimate finance.  
Another hallmark of U.S. policy has been to turn individuals vulnerable to 
prosecution into confidential informants as a way to identify other potential 
wrongdoers.79 As with the prevention strategy, this practice is neither unprecedented 
nor novel. Prosecutors identify individuals who may be subject to prosecution and 




 76. For a comprehensive analysis of this shift in policy, see Robert M. Chesney, The 
Sleeper Scenario: Terrorism-Support Laws and the Demands of Prevention, 42 HARV. J. 
LEGIS. 1, 26–36 (2005). Chesney argues that the shift in policy came after then-Attorney 
General John Ashcroft concluded that prevention of terrorist attacks should take a higher 
priority than ensuring that any evidence gathered would be admissible in court. Id. at 27. This 
shift led to several strategy changes, including arresting individuals for lower-level crimes 
such as immigration violations or detaining them as material witnesses. Id. at 30–36.  
 77. See, e.g., Press Release, U.S. Dep’t. of Justice, Three Florida Men Sentenced for 
Conspiring to Provide Material Support to ISIS (May 16, 2018), at https://www.justice.gov 
/opa/pr/three-florida-men-sentenced-conspiring-provide-material-support-isis 
[https://perma.cc/6J2W-D9XU].  
 78. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T. OF THE TREASURY, TERRORIST FINANCE TRACKING PROGRAM: 
FACT SHEET (Aug. 2, 2010), https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-
finance/Terrorist-Finance-Tracking/Documents/TFTP%20Fact%20Sheet%20revised%20-
%20(8-8-11).pdf [https://perma.cc/432Z-XQCR] (describing new regulations to monitor 
financial systems as part of counterterrorism strategy). 
 79. See, e.g., Jesse J. Norris & Hanna Grol-Prokopczyk, Estimating the Prevalence of 
Entrapment in Post-9/11 Terrorism Cases, 105 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 609, 617–19 
(2016) (describing FBI’s strategy of using confidential informants in terrorism cases). 
 80. For an analysis of the abuses that can occur in such cases, see generally COLUMBIA 
LAW SCHOOL HUMAN RIGHTS INSTITUTE, ILLUSION OF JUSTICE: HUMAN RIGHTS ABUSES IN US 
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All of these strategies depend, at least in part, on the ability of prosecutors to target 
individuals for providing material support to a designated terrorist organization 
before there is an extant terrorist plot. Counterterrorism and law enforcement 
officials count this as one of the most important tools in the fight against terrorism 
and have increasingly relied on it to build cases.  
That tool is unavailable in the fight against the new terrorism that Russian hackers 
and others have directed against the United States and others in the West over the 
past several years. In this Article, I argue that this tool should be available to 
prosecutors; there is doctrinal space for it in existing law. Making this tool available 
does not require a radical reimagining of existing law. Instead, it requires attention 
to the principles that have formed the foundation for existing rules and a willingness 
to adapt those rules to changed conditions.  
Part of the reason that the law has yet to catch up fully with the new forms of 
terrorism is simply a lack of imagination. Put differently, just as ordinary forms of 
work have evolved, so have terrorist entities. And the law has not yet adjusted. The 
U.S. government has been in the business of designating entities as FTOs since 
1997.81 As of mid-2019, there are sixty-nine entities that have been designated as 
FTOs by the U.S. State Department.82 So far, those entities have all been organized, 
hierarchical entities with clear leadership; some semblance of command structure; 
and some degree of organization, coherence, and integrity. The current law 
enforcement model is built on the assumption that terrorist organizations are such 
standing entities with some kind of core organizational structure. To be sure, these 
organizations are neither rigid nor unchanging, and their structures may not mimic 
that of the U.S. military, for example. But roughly speaking, existing law is based on 
the assumption that terrorist organizations are like traditional corporations: well 
organized, ideologically coherent, with identifiable boundaries. They may have 
suppliers or financiers, but all involved know whom they are working for and with. 
The designation of an entity as an FTO is done according to standards that appear to 
be based in a classical theory of the firm, but the world is changing. 
For many years, there have been good reasons to challenge that assumption, 
particularly with organizations such as al-Qaeda or the Islamic State. Even 
conventional organizations are constantly evolving, splintering, combining with 
other groups, and adding and shedding members.83 Policymakers and prosecutors 
have responded in two principal ways. First, policymakers have identified these new 
 
 
TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS (2014), https://web.law.columbia.edu/sites/default/files/microsites 
/human-rights-institute/files/report_final_draft.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z7BN-RMFT] 
(cataloging the ways that material support charges have been used to manipulate vulnerable 
defendants).   
 81. Designation occurs pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (2012). The first designations under 
the statute occurred in 1997, when twenty organizations were designated. See U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-15-629, COMBATING TERRORISM: FOREIGN TERRORIST 
DESIGNATION PROCESS AND U.S. AGENCY ENFORCEMENT ACTIONS 5 (2015) (noting that the 
first twenty designations occurred in 1997) [hereinafter GAO, COMBATING TERRORISM]. 
 82. JOHN W. ROLLINS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, 7–5700, IN FOCUS: FOREIGN 
TERRORIST ORGANIZATION (FTO) 2 (2019).  
 83. See Chesney, supra note 76, at 72–75 (cataloging evidence of shifts in terrorist 
organization structure and arguing that existing law is based on outdated assumptions).  
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splinter groups as independent entities and designated them as FTOs. For example, 
in 2004, the State Department designated the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (or 
ISIL) as an FTO.84 Since then, various branches of ISIL have been separately 
designated as FTOs, including ISIL-Sinai Peninsula, ISIL-Khorasan, ISIL in Libya, 
and ISIS branches in Bangladesh, the Philippines, and West Africa.85 This strategy 
recognizes the shifts taking place on the ground but has progressed slowly.  
Second, prosecutors have responded to changes in the nature of terrorist groups 
by stretching the definition of “material support” to cover activity that is further and 
further from the core of the organization. A person can be guilty of material support 
for activities that are increasingly disconnected from actual terror operations.  For 
example, translating controversial material and posting it on a website or listserv that 
is frequently used by people who are connected to a designated terrorist organization 
may be sufficient for a material support charge.86 The advent of looser terrorist 
structures, like that of al-Qaeda or similar groups, is a variation on the traditional 
theme, not a different approach altogether. The core organization is present and 
known to all, but the various cells may not know each other or closely coordinate.  
The new terrorist entities are different. They have more in common with new 
forms of project-based work arrangements than they do with traditional terrorist 
organizations. The entity may have come into existence only for a specific task, such 
as hacking the power grid in the Ukraine or influencing the elections in the United 
States. The entity likely has leadership and direction, but not a hierarchy or traditional 
organization structure. The various participants may not know each other or may 
know each other only through online aliases. The participants operate as a kind of 
team of freelancers, rather than as soldiers in the forces of a quasi-state or as the 
armed wing of a political party. Based on the available information, it is this kind of 
entity that appears to have conducted the attacks on the U.S. presidential election and 
other attacks in Europe since 2015.87  
Current U.S. policy appears to be based on the structure of the entity rather than 
on its activities, capacity to inflict harm, or purpose, but this result is not dictated by 
the law. Existing law could be used to designate entities such as those which 
interfered in the U.S. elections as FTOs, thereby enabling prosecutors to use a tool 
that has proven invaluable in other cases. To make this shift, there are two principal 
doctrinal issues that must be resolved. First, the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1189, requires 
that the entity be an “organization” but does not define or provide any guidance as 
to what this term means.88 To fill this gap, I draw on interdisciplinary literature 
relating to work arrangements to show that the entities that appear to have committed 
 
 
 84. See CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 82. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See, e.g., United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 47–49 (2013) (denying defendant’s 
argument on appeal that a material support conviction could not rest on his translation of 
potentially incendiary materials and posting the translations online). 
 87. See Oren Dorell, Alleged Russian Political Meddling Documented in 27 Countries 
Since 2004, USA TODAY (Sept. 7, 2017, 9:06 AM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/news 
/world/2017/09/07/alleged-russian-political-meddling-documented-27-countries-since-2004 
/619056001/ [https://perma.cc/KQ35-MUHQ] (reporting that Russia had interfered in at least 
twenty-seven elections in Europe and North America since 2004). 
 88. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
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the attacks on the United States and Western Europe have all the hallmarks of an 
organization and can meet the statutory definition contained in 8 U.S.C. § 1189. 
Second, the activities must constitute either “politically motivated violence” or a 
“violent attack.”89 To address this issue, I draw on the history of the law of terrorism 
to show that the activities undertaken by the entities that are the subject of my 
argument are the kind of attacks that the law has attempted to address. They may not 
have been violent in the same way as an improvised explosive device or a car bomb, 
but their effects threatened human life and disruption on a scale and of a kind similar 
to attacks that are commonly understood as violent attacks.  
Overcoming these doctrinal hurdles will not eliminate all possible complications 
or challenges. One obvious and important issue is timing. The process of designating 
a terrorist organization has both legal and political elements. The State Department 
is required to assemble evidence about the entity and determine if it meets the 
necessary criteria.90 The current process involves seeking and assessing information 
from sixteen federal agencies or departments across the government.91 For the tool 
to be most useful to prosecutors, the assessment process must be faster and more 
focused on the entity’s activities and purpose rather than on its structure. 
The United States, and many other states, maintain a number of terrorism-related 
watch lists. These lists, broadly conceived, create a process by which some part of 
the government makes factual findings about an individual or organization, puts that 
individual or organization on a list, and imposes legal restrictions on that individual 
or organization as a consequence.92 The FTO designation originated in the 1996 
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, which amended the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.93 At the time, proponents argued that the purpose of the statute was 
to give the government an additional tool to cut off support for terrorist 
organizations.94 Terrorist funding was one main target. The U.S. government has 
long argued that cutting off terrorists’ funding was an essential component of the 
 
 
 89. The requirement of “politically motivated violence” comes from 22 U.S.C. § 
2656f(d)(2) (2012). The “violent attack” language comes from 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) 
(2012). To be sure, the statute does not require a violent attack in all cases. Other possible 
forms of “terrorist activity” under the statute involve actions like hijacking aircrafts or ships, 
detaining persons and threatening to kill them, or assassination. See id. Those issues are 
obviously not implicated in my argument. 
 90. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 5–8 (describing the 
process used by the State Department to assemble evidence used to designate terrorist 
organizations). 
 91. See id. at 21. 
 92. The U.S. State Department maintains a comprehensive list of designated 
organizations. There are currently sixty-nine designated organizations. See U.S. DEP’T OF 
STATE, Foreign Terrorist Organizations, STATE.GOV, https://www.state.gov/foreign-terrorist-
organizations/ [https://perma.cc/32VW-FMZ3]. The European Union maintains multiple lists 
of people and organizations for similar purposes. See COUNCIL OF THE EUR. UNION, EU 
Terrorist List, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/policies/fight-against-terrorism/terrorist-
list/ [https://perma.cc/46EJ-JXDA].  
 93. CONG. RESEARCH SERV., supra note 82, at 1. 
 94. See generally Sean D. Murphy, Contemporary Practice of the United States Relating 
to International Law, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 102, 117–24 (2000) (reporting the objectives of the 
U.S. government when enacting statute).  
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government’s counterterrorism strategy.95 Another principal objective was to make 
it easier to prosecute individuals who helped terrorist groups.96 The FTO designation 
list was a way to help with both of these objectives. If a group was designated as an 
FTO, then its funding and its funders could be targeted without showing that the 
funding was connected to any particular terrorist plot.97 Similarly, individuals who 
assisted the designated organization could be prosecuted even in the absence of 
evidence of a specific terrorist plot.  
B. The Law of FTO Designation 
In the Parts that follow, I first describe the details of the designation process. The 
process takes place within the executive branch without substantial judicial 
oversight. I then explain the legal consequences of designation and show why it is 
such an important tool for law enforcement.  
1. Designation Process 
The designation of an organization as an FTO is done entirely within the executive 
branch. Under the statute, the Secretary of State may designate an organization based 
on three findings. The Secretary must determine that the organization is (a) a foreign 
organization that (b) engages in terrorism or has the ability and intent to do so, and 
(c) that the terrorist activity threatens the security of the United States or U.S. 
nationals.98 The State Department is charged with monitoring, and reporting on, 
terrorist activity around the world.99 Its annual reports provide an overview of 
 
 
 95. See generally MARTIN A. WEISS, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE, RS21902, 
TERRORIST FINANCING: THE 9/11 COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION (2005) (describing efforts 
to target terrorist financing). 
 96. Robert Chesney, Anticipatory Prosecution in Terrorism-Related Cases, in THE 
CHANGING ROLE OF THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR 157, 162–69 (John L. Worrall & M. Elaine 
Nugent-Borakove eds., 2008) (describing strategy to reduce impediments to terrorism 
prosecutions). 
 97. 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012) (providing for prosecution of individuals who 
provide material support for designated FTOs). 
 98. Specifically, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) provides as follows: 
The Secretary is authorized to designate an organization as a foreign terrorist 
organization in accordance with this subsection if the Secretary finds that-- 
(A) the organization is a foreign organization; 
(B) the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 
1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or terrorism (as defined in section 
2656f(d)(2) of Title 22), or retains the capability and intent to 
engage in terrorist activity or terrorism); and 
(C)  the terrorist activity or terrorism of the organization threatens the 
security of United States nationals or the national security of the 
United States. 
8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (2012). 
 99. See 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(a) (2012) (requiring the Secretary of State to assess and report 
on terrorist activities in foreign countries). 
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terrorist organizations working around the world100 and can help it identify groups to 
consider for designation.101 The State Department has established a multistep process 
to make this determination.102 After it has identified a potential designee, the 
Department initiates an “equity check” designed to ensure that the designation will 
not interfere with some other national security or law enforcement priority or 
operation.103 The State Department consults with other members of the intelligence 
community for their input as well.104 
After the equity check, the State Department begins to assemble the 
administrative dossier necessary to make the designation decision.105 This is the 
evidentiary record that will support the eventual decision.106 When the record is fully 
assembled, the State Department shares this record with the Justice and Treasury 
Departments for their agreement to go forward.107 It is on this record that the 
Secretary of State makes his or her decision.108 Under the statute, the State 
Department must notify Congress before the organization is designated109 and then 
must publish the designation decision in the Federal Register.110 
What is noteworthy about this process is that it is entirely within the executive 
branch and does not provide meaningful opportunities for target organizations to 
contest the evidence on which the decision is made.111 The designated organization 
 
 
 100. See U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM 2017 (2018) (reporting 
on terrorist activity and counterterrorism efforts in countries around the world). 
 101. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 5 (reporting that the 
Bureau of Counterterrorism within the State Department “monitors the activities of terrorist 
groups around the world to identify potential targets for designation”). 
 102. See id. at 6 (describing six-step process by which the State Department makes the 
designation decision). It is important to note that some of the steps in the State Department’s 
process are not mandated by statute. Instead, they appear to be internal checks designed to 
regularize the process.  
 103. Id. at 7 (stating that the goal of the equity check is to determine if “law enforcement, 
diplomatic, or intelligence concerns should prevent the designation of the target 
organization”). 
 104. Id. at 9–10 (reporting that the officials from the Departments of Defense, Justice, and 
Treasury and the CIA, NSA, National Counterterrorism Center, and National Security Council 
provide information during the equity check). 
 105. Id. at 10 (describing process of creating administrative record to support designation 
decision). 
 106. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(3) (2012) (requiring the Secretary of State to “create an 
administrative record” and permitting the Secretary to “consider classified information” in the 
process). 
 107. See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 10 (reporting that the State 
Department seeks the concurrence of Justice and Treasury before finalizing the administrative 
record). 
 108. See 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1) (providing that that the Secretary of State makes the 
designation decision); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 6 (describing 
steps in the designation process). 
 109. Id. § 1189(a)(2)(A)(i) (requiring the Secretary of State to notify select members of 
Congress seven days before making the designation decision). 
 110. Id. § 1189 (a)(2)(A)(ii) (requiring publication of the designation decision in the 
Federal Register seven days after providing notice to Congress). 
 111. For a more substantial analysis of the process, see generally Randolph N. Jonakait, A 
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may seek judicial review of the decision.112 However, the designated organization 
has no right to present evidence on its own behalf,113 and the government is permitted 
to rely on classified information that it does not disclose to the organization but is 
provided to the reviewing court ex parte and in camera.114 Courts may set aside the 
designation decision only if there is no substantial basis in the record to support it or 
if the Secretary of State acted unconstitutionally, illegally, or arbitrarily.115 Congress 
has the power to revoke or block a designation decision for any reason.116 
2. Legal Consequences of Designation  
The designation of an organization has three principal consequences. First, it 
makes it possible for the government to prosecute individuals who provide material 
support to the organization.117 Prosecution for material support for terrorism has 
become one of the U.S. government’s most powerful tools in its counterterrorism 
strategy.118 Using the material support statute, prosecutors may charge an individual 
with providing support for terrorism for virtually any assistance to a designated 
organization. Individuals who translate documents, engage in social media 
campaigns, or otherwise help the organization are vulnerable to prosecution.119 In 
 
 
Double Due Process Denial: The Crime of Providing Material Support or Resources to 
Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations, 48 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 125 (2003) (arguing that 
the designation process and its consequences violate the U.S. Constitution).  
 112. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(c) (detailing review process). 
 113. Id. § 1189(c)(2) (providing that judicial review “shall be based solely on the 
administrative record”). 
 114. Id. § 1189(c)(2) (permitting the government to present classified components of the 
judicial record “ex parte and in camera”). 
 115. Id.  § 1189(c)(3) (providing bases for setting aside a designation decision). 
 116. Id.  § 1189(a)(5) (providing that “Congress, by an Act of Congress, may block or 
revoke” a designation decision). 
 117. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2012). The statue provides as follows:  
Whoever knowingly provides material support or resources to a foreign terrorist 
organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, shall be fined under this title or 
imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both, and, if the death of any person 
results, shall be imprisoned for any term of years or for life. To violate this 
paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the organization is a designated 
terrorist organization (as defined in subsection (g)(6)), that the organization has 
engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as defined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the organization has engaged or 
engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) of the Foreign Relations 
Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).  
Id.  
 118. See DOYLE, TERRORIST MATERIAL SUPPORT, supra note 12, at 1 (noting, based on 
Congressional testimony of counterterrorism experts, that the “two federal material support 
statutes have been at the heart of the Justice Department’s terrorist prosecution efforts”). 
 119. See, e.g., United States. v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 47–49 (1st Cir. 2013) (describing 
defendant’s role in translating materials and posting the translations online); Matt Zapotosky, 
Northern Virginia Teen Sentenced to 11 Years for Aiding Islamic State, WASH. POST (Aug. 30, 
2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/crime/a-sophisticated-terrorist-supporter-or-a-
troubled-teen/2015/08/27/9138cb6e-4c1e-11e5-bfb9-9736d04fc8e4_story.html 
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addition, the threat of a material-support prosecution has become an important 
additional tool for prosecutors seeking to obtain information on terrorist 
organizations.120 Prosecutors, armed with the credible threat of a material-support 
prosecution, have powerful leverage to encourage those involved with terrorist 
groups to become informants or cooperating witnesses.  
The second consequence of designation is that the Secretary of the Treasury may 
freeze the designated organization’s assets and block its financial transactions.121 
This essentially closes the U.S. financial system to the organization and makes it 
illegal for individuals to conduct transactions with the organization.122 Finally, 
individuals associated with designated organizations face travel bans or other 
restrictions.123 They are barred from entering the United States and non-citizens face 
removal if they are in the United States.124  
III. APPLYING FTO DESIGNATION TO THE NEW ATTACKS 
I argue that the U.S. government should designate as terrorist organizations the 
entities that interfered in the 2016 elections and attacked critical infrastructure. To 
do so, the government could rely on existing legal tools. In this Part, I argue that 
there are three principal doctrinal issues relating to designation of the new 
organizations: whether they constitute an “organization” under the statute, whether 
their behavior threatens national security, and whether they engage in “terrorism” as 
that term is defined in U.S. law. To preview my conclusions, I argue that these 
doctrinal hurdles can be surmounted without unduly stretching the law.  
The FTO designation process has both political and legal dimensions. The State 
Department must apply specific, albeit poorly defined, statutory criteria when it 
 
 
[https://perma.cc/J8R8-6CUG] (reporting on the sentencing of Ali Amin, convicted of 
material support for terrorism for running a pro-ISIS Twitter account). 
 120. See, e.g., Emily Stabile, Recruiting Terrorism Informants: The Problems with 
Immigration Incentives and the S-6 Visa, 102 CAL. L. REV. 235, 236–38 (2014) (describing 
FBI’s recruitment of informants using threats of prosecution for material support). 
 121. 8 U.S.C. § 1189 (a)(2)(C) (2012). The statute provides as follows: 
Upon notification under paragraph (2)(A)(i), the Secretary of the Treasury may 
require United States financial institutions possessing or controlling any assets 
of any foreign organization included in the notification to block all financial 
transactions involving those assets until further directive from either the 
Secretary of the Treasury, Act of Congress, or order of court. 
Id.  
 122. See 31 C.F.R. § 597.201 (2018) (requiring all financial institutions to “block all 
financial transactions involving any assets” of a designated organization); see also U.S. GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 81, at 11–12 (describing steps taken by the U.S. 
government to freeze assets and block financial transactions of designated organizations). 
 123. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B), (F) (blocking entry or making deportable individuals 
who engage in terrorist activities or who are members of designated organizations); Id. § 
1227(a)(4)(B). 
 124. See id.  § 1182(a)(3)(B), (F) (blocking entry or making deportable individuals who 
engage in terrorist activities or who are members of designated organizations); id. § 
1227(a)(4)(B). 
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decides to designate an entity.125 But the State Department is not required to 
designate organizations, leading to disagreement among policymakers about whether 
to designate politically sensitive organizations.126 In this Part, I first address the 
doctrinal issues that would arise if the State Department attempted to designate an 
entity like the one responsible for the interference in the 2016 elections. I then argue 
that the designation process must adapt to fit the entities that are conducting some of 
the most damaging terrorist attacks today. 
The doctrinal hurdles are substantial but can all be addressed within the law. Put 
differently, my approach does not hinge on the passage of a new statute or the radical 
reinterpretation of existing doctrine. I address three doctrinal issues. First, I argue 
that entities like the one that interfered in the 2016 elections are organizations under 
the statute. The statute does not define the term and previous contested designated 
cases have not turned on whether an entity constitutes an organization. With this 
dearth of precedent, I draw on similar concepts from elsewhere in the law, including 
the law of armed conflict in international law, domestic conspiracy law, and 
interdisciplinary scholarly research on organizations. A second statutory criterion is 
that the activity of the designated organization must threaten the “security of United 
States nationals or the national security of the United States.”127 I argue that threats 
to civilian infrastructure and the integrity of political processes are threats to national 
security. Finally, a designated organization must engage in terrorist activity.128 The 
relevant statutory definitions of terrorism require either “politically motivated 
violence”129 or a “violent attack.”130 Attacks on political processes or threats to 
civilian infrastructure meet these criteria even if they do not cause death or direct 
physical trauma to individuals.  
 
 
 125. See id. § 1189(a)(1). 
 126. See, e.g., Stephen Roy Jackson, Terror in Mexico: Why Designating Mexican Cartels 
as Terrorist Organizations Eases Prosecution of Drug Traffickers Under the Narcoterrorism 
Statute, 4 NAT’L SEC. L.J. 83 (2015) (arguing that Mexican drug cartels meet the criteria for 
designation and that their designation would be consistent with U.S. law enforcement policy); 
Robert Chesney, The Haqqani Network Not (Yet) a Designated Foreign Terrorist 
Organization, LAWFARE (Sept. 23, 2011, 7:11 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/haqqani-
network-not-yet-designated-foreign-terrorist-organization-ridiculous-i-agree-how-much-does 
[https://perma.cc/JFJ7-GR5C] (arguing that the Haqqani Network, a terrorist organization 
operating in Afghanistan and Pakistan, fits the criteria for designation); Audrey Kurth Cronin, 
Why the Haqqani Network is Not on the Foreign Terrorist Organizations List, FOREIGN AFF. 
(Dec. 21, 2011), https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2011-12-21/why-haqqani-network-
not-foreign-terrorist-organizations-list [https://perma.cc/FT9Q-SMGS] (describing political 
arguments over whether the Haqqani Network should be designated). 
 127. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C). 
 128. Id. § 1189(a)(1)(B) (requiring that “the organization engages in terrorist activity (as 
defined in section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or terrorism (as defined in section 2656f(d)(2) of 
Title 22), or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism”). 
 129. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012). 
 130. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii). 
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A. The Nature of an Organization Under the Statute 
The FTO statute does not define what constitutes an organization under the law. 
The statute has been litigated but none of the reported decisions have addressed this 
issue. Prosecutors have asserted without proof, and defendants have accepted without 
contesting, that the targeted entity fulfilled the organization requirement under the 
statute. Even without guidance from the statute governing the designation of foreign 
terrorist organizations discussed above, there are other areas of the law from which 
a definition might be borrowed or adapted.131 First, the U.S. statute that allows 
prosecutors to target Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) 
provides some helpful guidance.132 The RICO statute was enacted to allow 
prosecutors to target those whose activities contributed to organized crime.133 
Second, the development of joint criminal enterprise (JCE) liability in international 
criminal tribunals has allowed international prosecutors to prosecute individuals who 
contributed to an entity that caused harmful criminal conduct, even if the defendant 
was not herself the physical perpetrator of the crimes.134 This doctrine has necessarily 
included some consideration of what constitutes a criminal “enterprise.”135 Finally, 
the development of the law of conspiracy in the United States has also required 
consideration of what transforms a collection of individuals into a conspiracy under 
the law.136  
To preview my conclusions, I argue that the term “organization,” when used in 
the FTO statute, is a collection of people who knowingly associate with others to 
accomplish a shared purpose or goal. To be sure, this simple definition is not likely 
to fully address the nuances of every potential entity, especially informal terrorist 
organizations. But it is sufficient to serve two purposes. First, by adopting this 
definition, prosecutors could target organizations that are destructive and actively 
engaging in terrorist activities but which have not formalized their structure or openly 
declared their existence. As the law now stands, terrorist organizations that are 
sufficiently sophisticated to work together and hide their existence have access to 
more tools and resources than those that openly declare their existence. The second 
purpose this definition serves is to provide practical guidance to prosecutors or 
 
 
 131. See generally Catherine H. Gibson, Testing the Legitimacy of the Joint Criminal 
Enterprise Doctrine in the ICTY: A Comparison of Individual Liability for Group Conduct in 
International and Domestic Law, 18 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 521 (2008) (describing the 
evolution of joint criminal enterprise liability). 
 132. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961–68 (1970). 
 133. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R7-5700, RICO: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1 
(2016) [hereinafter DOYLE, RICO] (describing origins and purpose of RICO statute). 
 134. See generally Allison Marston Danner & Jenny S. Martinez, Guilty Associations: 
Joint Criminal Enterprise, Command Responsibility, and the Development of International 
Criminal Law, 93 CALIF. L. REV. 75 (2005) (providing history of joint criminal enterprise 
liability to hold accountable those who are not physical perpetrators of crimes). 
 135.  See DOYLE, RICO supra note 133, at 12–13 (describing analysis of what constitutes 
an “enterprise”). 
 136. See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41223, FEDERAL 
CONSPIRACY LAW: A BRIEF OVERVIEW (2016) (hereinafter, DOYLE, CONSPIRACY LAW) 
(describing conspiracy law in the United States). 
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policymakers who wish to target an informal terrorist organization. To prove that an 
entity is an organization under the statute, policymakers might start by showing the 
pattern of interactions among the participants. They could show, for example, that 
some in the organization had decided to target a state’s electoral processes and that 
they had communicated with others to develop the technical tools to do this. Or they 
could show that there was a pattern of financial transactions that benefitted those 
undertaking terrorist actions. As to the requisite shared purpose, policymakers could 
assemble evidence regarding the targets of terrorist actions and use that evidence to 
support an inference of shared purpose.  
Under the RICO statute, an individual may be prosecuted if she participates in an 
enterprise which engages in criminal activity.137 As the statute has been put to use, 
the purpose of the law is not to prohibit substantive conduct which would not 
otherwise be criminal. Instead, the statute gives tools to prosecutors to target 
individuals whose criminal activity is associated with others. Put another way, the 
RICO statute allows the government to prosecute individuals who work with, or 
through, organizations to commit criminal acts. Originally conceived to prevent 
organized crime from infiltrating legitimate businesses, the statute has been broadly 
used against a wide range of organizations that engage in criminal activity.138 
Most relevant for my purposes is the way the statute and subsequent cases have 
defined the term “enterprise.” Under the statute, an enterprise includes traditional 
entities like corporations or partnerships.139 Importantly, it also includes “any . . .  
group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”140 Such an 
enterprise can include governmental and nongovernmental actors and may be formed 
to undertake legitimate activities or illicit activities.141 To constitute an enterprise, 
the U.S. Supreme Court has held that an association-in-fact must have three structural 
elements: “a purpose, relationships among those associated with the enterprise, and 
longevity sufficient to permit these associates to pursue the enterprise’s purpose.”142 
Put simply, such an enterprise is a “group of persons associated together for a 
common purpose of engaging in a course of conduct.”143 Thus, what matters is that 
there is some relationship among those involved in the enterprise and that it exists to 
serve a larger goal or purpose. Importantly, it does not require that all of those 
involved be known to each other, be in direct communication, or work according to 
any particular hierarchy.  
The theory of JCE, developed by the International Criminal Tribunal for the 
Former Yugoslavia (ICTY), is another useful source of guidance on what constitutes 
 
 
 137. See DOYLE, RICO, supra note 133, at 2–6 (analyzing elements of RICO statute).  
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 12–13. 
 140. Under 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (2012), an enterprise “includes any individual, 
partnership, corporation, association, or other legal entity, and any union or group of 
individuals associated in fact although not a legal entity.”  
 141. See DOYLE, RICO, supra note 133, at 12–14 (analyzing organization elements of 
RICO statute).  
 142. Boyle v. United States, 556 U.S. 938, 946 (2009).  
 143. United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 583 (1981). 
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an organization.144 JCE is a mode of criminal liability that permits prosecutors to 
charge individuals who are not the physical perpetrator of a crime for criminal acts 
done by others if they were part of the same enterprise.145 In creating the doctrine, 
the ICTY was interpreting its statute, which provided that people could be held 
individually criminally responsible for crimes if they “planned, instigated, ordered, 
committed, or otherwise aided and abetted in the planning or execution” of the 
crime.146 The ICTY Appeals Chamber, in Tadic, held that the statute permitted 
conviction of individuals if they were part of a “joint criminal enterprise,” that is: 
“several persons having a common purpose embark on criminal activity that is then 
carried out either jointly or by some members of this plurality of persons.”147 To 
convict, prosecutors must show, among other things, that there was a “plurality of 
persons” and a “common plan, design or purpose.”148 Importantly, the appeals 
chamber held that the prosecution did not need to show that the plurality of persons 
was organized in any particular way or that every element of the common purpose 
was known to all members.149 Although the doctrine of JCE has continued to evolve 
and become ever more complex, its definition of what constitutes an enterprise 
remains useful. As with the RICO statute, what matters is that there is a collective of 
persons whose actions contribute to a larger plan or purpose. The collective need not 
have any particular structure or hierarchy. In addition, the collective need not think 
of or see itself as an enterprise. Put differently, a JCE need not declare itself such or 
even see itself as such.  
The final area of law that is relevant to defining “organization” is the law of 
criminal conspiracy. Broadly speaking, under U.S. law, a conspiracy requires an 
agreement between two or more persons and an intent to undertake a certain 
objective.150 The agreement need not be explicit or proven through direct evidence. 
But the government must prove that those involved in the conspiracy had a shared 
purpose and acted accordingly.151  
 
 
 144. See generally Danner & Martinez, supra note 134 (describing history and contours of 
joint criminal enterprise). 
 145. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-1-A, Opinion and Judgement, ¶¶ 195–204 
(Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 7, 1997) (describing the three categories of 
joint criminal enterprise liability). See generally Danner & Martinez, supra note 134 
(providing history of the development of liability for those who are not physical perpetrators 
of crimes). 
 146. The statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia was 
adopted by the U.N. Security Council in 1993 pursuant to S.C. Res. 827 and has been amended 
several times since then. Updated Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former 
Yugoslavia (Sept. 2009), http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Statute/statute_sept09 
_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/2M46-89XY]. Article 7(1) of the statute provides as follows: “A 
person who planned, instigated, ordered, committed or otherwise aided and abetted in the 
planning, preparation or execution of a crime referred to in articles 2 to 5 of the present Statute, 
shall be individually responsible for the crime.” Id.  
 147. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-I-A, ¶ 190. 
 148. Id. ¶ 227.  
 149. See id. ¶ 190. 
 150. See 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SUBSTANTIVE CRIMINAL LAW § 12.2 (3d ed. 2018) 
(describing elements of conspiracy under U.S. law). 
 151. See DOYLE, CONSPIRACY LAW, supra note 136, at 4–7 (describing requirements 
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The legal analogues on which I draw share two principal characteristics that are 
prominent in the social science literature on organizations and organizational 
structure. The first is that an organization—as distinct from a random collection of 
individuals—has some identifiable network of social relations.152 Put differently, a 
necessary component of an organization is some regular pattern of interaction among 
the individuals who constitute it. The second requirement is that those in the 
organization must be united by some shared belief or goals.153 These two 
characteristics—regular interactions and shared goals or beliefs—are present in each 
of the legal concepts, albeit to different degrees.  
Scholars who study terrorism have devoted considerable attention to defining 
terrorism and terrorist groups, but most of that attention goes to other issues.154 
Although this literature does not fully address the question of what constitutes an 
organization, it is nonetheless helpful. First, the scant scholarship on the issue is 
consistent with the ways that legal policymakers and advocates have approached the 
issue. Second, the theoretical literature helps to illuminate what should not be part of 
the definition.  
Much of the literature is focused on determining what kind of activity a group 
must engage in to be considered a terrorist organization.155 For example, is a 
liberation group that uses violence a terrorist organization in the same way as 
anarchists or those who use violence in organized crime? But what is important for 
my purposes is to determine what constitutes an organization. That is, are there 
particular characteristics that must be present to conclude that any given grouping of 
people is a terrorist organization and not simply a group of like-minded and violent 
people? On this issue the literature is thin, but it does provide some helpful ideas. 
Some scholars borrow from the political scientist James Q. Wilson, who argued that 
organizations were formal voluntary associations.156 This loose definition does not 
address how formal or organized the entity must be to be considered an organization. 
Counterterrorism policy makers have long recognized that the precise structure of a 
terrorist entity is less important than whether it is able to inflict harm or otherwise 
spread its message.157 An entity might have a rigid hierarchical structure like the 
 
 
regarding agreements among the participants in a conspiracy under U.S. law). 
 152. See PETER M. BLAU & W. RICHARD SCOTT, FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS: A 
COMPARATIVE APPROACH 2 (1962) (arguing that social organizations have a “structure of 
social relations in a group or larger collectivity of people”). 
 153. See id. (arguing that those in a social organization have “shared beliefs and 
orientations that unite the members . . . and guide their conduct”). 
 154. See generally Brian J. Phillips, What Is a Terrorist Group? Conceptual Issues and 
Empirical Implications, 27 TERRORISM & POL. VIOLENCE 225 (2015) (analyzing research on 
defining terrorist groups). 
 155. See, e.g., BRUCE HOFFMAN, INSIDE TERRORISM 1–34 (1998). (analyzing various 
definitions of terrorism and terrorist activity). 
 156. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, POLITICAL ORGANIZATIONS 31 (Princeton Univ. 
Press 1995) (describing the characteristics of organizations). Wilson’s influence has extended 
to those who study terrorist groups. See, e.g., Phillips, supra note 154, at 227 (using Wilson’s 
framework to understand terrorist organizations). 
 157. See generally U.S. ARMY TRAINING & DOCTRINE COMMAND, A MILITARY GUIDE TO 
TERRORISM IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2007) (analyzing capacity of organizations to 
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army of a state, or it might have a loose networked structure in which each cell 
operates almost independently.  A terrorist organization can operate effectively with 
either structure. Thus, internal structure does not determine whether an entity is an 
organization.  
The areas of law that I have considered are useful because they can provide some 
help in interpreting a term that is not defined in the FTO statute and do so along the 
same dimensions that organizational theory suggests are necessary. Borrowing legal 
definitions from one context and applying them in another should be done with some 
caution and particular attention to the purposes of each context. In each of the cases—
RICO, JCE, and conspiracy—the principal issue is how to determine the individual 
criminal liability of a person who was part of, or associated with, a collection of 
individuals that committed criminal acts. Broadly speaking, the contested question 
is whether the individual has a sufficient connection to the group to justify, under 
some standard of law or morality, holding him or her responsible for criminal acts 
perpetrated by another person. The FTO context raises different questions: what are 
the characteristics of an “organization,” and does the collection of governments, 
individuals, and entities involved in new terrorist attacks possess those 
characteristics? The question of individual criminal responsibility is a separate 
question. The effect of finding that an individual participated in a criminal conspiracy 
is to convict him or her of a crime. The effect of the designation decision is to label 
the organization as off limits. It does not convict the organization, or any individuals, 
of anything.   
B. Threat to U.S. National Security 
The FTO designation statute requires the Secretary of State to find that the 
organization's activity “threatens the security” of the United States or of U.S. 
nationals.158 A designated organization may challenge the Secretary of State's 
decision on a number of grounds, 159 but it may not challenge the Secretary's national 
security conclusion.160 Thus, the Secretary of State’s conclusion that the 
 
 
inflict damage and arguing that such capacity is more important than the structure of the 
organization). 
 158. 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(C) (2012).  
 159. With respect to judicial review, the statute provides as follows at 8 U.S.C. § 1189 
(c)(3): 
The Court shall hold unlawful and set aside a designation, amended designation, 
or determination in response to a petition for revocation the court finds to be-- 
(A) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in  
accordance with law; 
(B)  contrary to constitutional right, power, privilege, or immunity; 
(C)  in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitation, or short  
of statutory right; 
(D)  lacking substantial support in the administrative record taken as a  
whole or in classified information submitted to the court under  
paragraph (2), or 
(E)   not in accord with the procedures required by law. 
Id. § 1189(c)(3).  
 160. See People’s Mojahedin Org. v. U.S. Dep’t of State, 182 F.3d 17, 23 (D.C. Cir. 1999) 
2020] CHANGING FACE OF TERRORISM  815 
 
organization's activities threaten national security is reviewed only to ensure that 
there was evidence to support it and that it was not reached capriciously.161 The FTO 
designation statute does not define the term “national security,” but the term is 
defined elsewhere in the same chapter of the U.S. Code as relating to “the national 
defense and foreign relations of the United States.”162 This scant guidance does little 
to change the fact that determining what is a threat to the national security of a 
sovereign state is an inherently political and problematic task. It is beyond the scope 
of this Article to provide a positive theory of national security, but it is nonetheless 
important to provide at least some more insight into the concept of national security 
and to consider how and why attacks such as those against critical infrastructure in 
Ukraine and elsewhere or those against the electoral process in the United States 
might constitute a threat to national security.  
Scholars and advocates have devoted attention to the concept of national 
security.163 The FTO designation process is one of a number of tools that enable the 
U.S. government to identify and respond to external threats to U.S. interests. In the 
context of counterterrorism policy and the FTO designation process, the concept of 
national security is focused on external threats to the United States or U.S. interests. 
These threats might be against U.S. territory or persons, or against critical systems 
like transportation, and can come from a variety of sources.  Consider the definition 
of national security put forward by the political scientist Richard H. Ullman, who 
argued that threats to national security could come in two broad categories.164 The 
first category is actions that threaten “drastically and over a relatively brief span of 
time to degrade the quality of life for the inhabitants of a state.”165 This category 
might include terrorist attacks such as those on September 11, 2001. Ullman 
describes this category as including those incidents after which “the well-being of a 
society had been drastically impaired” in a way that was obvious.166 The second 
category comprises those threats that significantly “narrow the range of policy 
choices available to the government of a state or to private . . . entities . . . within the 
state.”167 This category might include slower-developing threats or those whose 
impacts cause a cascade of problems that eventually affect the state at issue.168 
Perhaps the most useful definition in the context of the FTO designations statute 
 
 
(noting that the national security issue is “nonjusticiable” under the statute, and that the 
nonjusticiability of that issue did not render the state's review procedures infirm). 
 161. 8 U.S.C § 1189(c)(3).  
 162. See id. § 1531(3), which provides that “the term ‘national security’ has the same 
meaning as in section 1(b) of the Classified Information Procedures Act.” That Act, 18 U.S.C. 
app. 3, §§ 1–16 (2012), states that “National security . . . means the national defense and 
foreign relations of the United States.” 18 U.S.C. app. 3, §1(b). 
 163. For an early treatment of the issue, see generally Arnold Wolfers, “National Security” 
as an Ambiguous Symbol, 4 POL. SCI. Q. 481 (1952). Wolfers argues that security connotes, 
among other things, the absence of external threats to national wealth or power. Id. at 484–85.  
 164. See Richard H. Ullman, Redefining Security, 8 INT’L SECURITY 129, 133–34 (1981) 
(arguing that threats to national security could be assigned to groups based on their 
characteristics). 
 165. Id. at 133. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. 
 168. Id. at 133–34. 
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might be one that comes from an environmental law scholar, who argues that a 
“threat to national security is a situation in which some of the nation’s most important 
values are drastically degraded by external action.”169 This definition has the 
appropriate focus on external threats and is therefore consistent with the statute’s 
reference to “foreign relations.”  
Perhaps more important than scholarship on the issue is the fact that this definition 
is consistent with the way that government officials have discussed potential attacks 
on critical infrastructure or attempts to undermine electoral processes.170 
Policymakers from across the political spectrum have described the attempts to 
undermine the 2016 elections in the strongest possible terms, describing them as 
grave threats to U.S. national interests and ongoing threats to national security.171 
There have been, and continue to be, extensive investigations into the exact nature 
of the interference, and the investigations are premised on the argument that the 
interference represented a serious threat to national security. State and local election 
officials have begun to devote substantial resources to protecting the integrity of 
electoral systems, again premised on the argument that attempts to undermine 
elections would amount to a grave threat to national security.172  
Similarly, security professionals in the U.S. government have argued that the 
protection of civilian infrastructure is vital. For example, in the 1990s, President 
Clinton appointed a commission to study the security of U.S. infrastructure.173 That 
commission’s report began by noting that “national defense, economic prosperity, 
and quality of life have long depended on the essential services that underpin our 
society.”174 That report detailed the ways that attacks—physical or cyber—on 
elements of civilian infrastructure would significantly erode quality of life, disrupt 
civilian activities, and undermine security.175 More recently, President Obama issued 
 
 
 169. Marc A. Levy, Is the Environment a National Security Issue?, 20 INT'L SECURITY 35, 
40 (1995).  
 170. See, e.g., BRIAN E. HUMPHREYS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R45809, CRITICAL 
INFRASTRUCTURE: EMERGING TRENDS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FOR CONG. 1–3 (2019) 
(describing history of concern for attacks on critical infrastructure); Thomas P. Bossert, It’s 
Official: North Korea is Behind WannaCry, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 18, 2017), https://wsj.com 
/articles/its-official-north-korea-is-behind-wannacry-1513642537 [https://perma.cc/SS3Q-
QHW5] (commentary by the homeland security advisor describing grave consequences of 
cyber-attacks on infrastructure). 
 171. See, e.g., Jennifer Steinhauer, Senate and House Leaders Call for Inquiry of Russian 
Hacking in Election, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 12, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/12/12/us 
/politics/mcconnell-supports-inquiry-of-russian-hacking-during-election.html 
[https://perma.cc/F6FW-99KA] (reporting that Republicans and Democrats strongly 
condemned interference in the election and had called for an investigation into the issue). 
 172. See SENATE SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, 116TH CONG., REPORT ON RUSSIAN 
ACTIVE MEASURES CAMPAIGNS AND INTERFERENCE IN THE 2016 ELECTION: RUSSIAN EFFORTS 
AGAINST ELECTION INFRASTRUCTURE 49–52, REP. 116-XX, (describing the role of the states in 
addressing electoral interference). 
 173. See CRITICAL FOUNDATIONS: PROTECTING AMERICA'S INFRASTRUCTURES, REPORT OF 
THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON CRITICAL INFRASTRUCTURE PROTECTION (1997). 
 174. Id. at IX. 
 175. Id. at 3–5. 
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a Presidential Policy Directive on the threats to civilian infrastructure.176 As with the 
earlier report, that directive connected “the Nation’s safety, prosperity, and well-
being” to the maintenance of “secure, functioning, and resilient critical 
infrastructure.”177  
C. Defining Terrorism 
Under the FTO state, the Secretary of State must find that the organization 
engages in terrorist activity,178 which means it engages in “politically motivated 
violence”179 or that it has conducted a violent attack.180 Although much of U.S. law 
enforcement and foreign policy is devoted to countering terrorism and terrorist 
activity, there exists surprisingly little consensus around the concept and definition 
of terrorism.181 U.S. statutes contain several different definitions of terrorism, which 
only adds to the conceptual confusion, much of which is beyond the scope of this 
Article. What most definitions share, however, is the requirement that the targeted 
behavior involve violence.182 This requirement is the most significant doctrinal 
hurdle for my approach. In this Part, I argue that the U.S. should move beyond a 
formalist approach to defining terrorism to a more functional approach, which would 
accommodate terrorist activity that is not violent in any conventional sense, and that 
existing law would allow for such a shift in approach.  
The FTO statute refers to two other statutes to define terrorism and both refer to 
violence.183 This is consistent with most scholarly definitions of terrorism, which 
 
 
 176. Directive on Critical Infrastructure Security and Resilience, 2013 PUB. PAPERS 106 
(Feb. 12, 2013). 
 177. Id. at 106.  
 178. The relevant portion of the statute, 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(B) (2012), provides that the 
Secretary of State must find that "the organization engages in terrorist activity (as defined in 
section 1182(a)(3)(B) of this title or terrorism (as defined in section 2656f(d)(2) of Title 22) 
or retains the capability and intent to engage in terrorist activity or terrorism)." 
 179. 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2012).  
 180. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B)(iii) (defining terrorism to include, among other 
activities, a “violent attack upon an internationally protected person . . . or upon the liberty of 
such a person”).  
 181. This is not a new problem. For a survey of some of the attempts to define terrorism 
by policymakers, see generally Michael P. Scharf, Defining Terrorism as the Peacetime 
Equivalent of War Crimes: Problems and Prospects, 36 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 359, 359 
(2004) (arguing that the “problem of defining ‘terrorism’ has vexed the international 
community for decades”). There is perhaps even less scholarly consensus about how to define 
terrorism. See George P. Fletcher, The Indefinable Concept of Terrorism, 4 J. INT’L CRIM. 
JUST. 894 (2006). Fletcher argues that because the concept of terrorism is used so frequently 
and to describe so much behavior, it is impossible to arrive at a consensus definition. Id. at 
895–900. Instead he argues that terrorism should be defined by resort to a collection of factors, 
some of which must be present for a given action to be described as terrorism but none of 
which must be present in every case. Id. at 910–11. 
 182. See generally Nicholas J. Perry, The Numerous Federal Legal Definitions of 
Terrorism: The Problem of Too Many Grails, 30 J. LEGIS. 249 (2004) (describing the various 
definitions of the term “terrorism” in U.S. law). 
 183. In 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1)(B), the FTO statute refers to two other provisions of the 
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also typically include some mention of violence.184 For example, Bruce Hoffman, a 
leading scholar of terrorism, argues that terrorism involves “the deliberate creation 
and exploitation of fear through violence or the threat of violence.”185 Walter Enders 
and Todd Sandler, other leading scholars of terrorism, define it as “the premeditated 
use or threat to use violence . . . in order to obtain a political or social objective.”186 
But in these definitions, violence is serving as a kind of proxy for something more 
important. Violence is part of the definition of terrorism because some scholars 
assumed that without “violence or its threat, terrorists cannot make a political 
decision maker respond to their demands.”187 Violence is that which “inspire[s] terror 
in its victims and those indirectly affected.”188 It is the ingredient that serves to 
intimidate civilians.189 Thus “the essence of terrorism lies in the intent behind the act 
of violence,” which is to frighten civilians and disrupt important aspects of their 
lives.190  
The attempts to disrupt the U.S. elections and the attacks on critical infrastructure 
in Europe highlight the need to move from a formalist definition of what constitutes 
a terrorist act to a functional one, and the FTO designation process is the appropriate 
venue to do so for several reasons. It is an inevitably political process. The Secretary 
of State must follow the statutory mandate but exercises great discretion throughout 
the process.191 This is different from a criminal prosecution, where precision and 
specificity are necessarily more prominent.  
Even more important than the appropriateness of the venue is the need to 
recognize that violence is simply not the only means by which these new terrorists 
can attempt to exert coercive force over political leaders or disrupt the lives of 
civilians. Consider the effects and potential effects of the interference with the U.S. 
elections. Competently managing the electoral process is among the most important 
civilian functions that a government undertakes. There are scores of examples of the 
grave consequences that can flow from electoral processes that are seen as tainted or 
unduly influenced by illegitimate considerations like foreign financing or 
interference.  The harms caused by electoral interference are similar in kind and 
magnitude to those associated with events—like bombings or attacks by gunmen—
that have long fitted comfortably within the definition of terrorism. Electoral 
 
 
law—8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(3)(B) and 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2)—for the definition of terrorism. 
 184. For a survey of legal definitions, including the identification of common elements, 
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 188. Tiefenbrun, supra note 184, at 362.  
 189. See Fletcher, supra note 181, at 901–02 (arguing that violence must have as its 
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FTO designation process and the role of the Secretary of State). 
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interference causes civilians to doubt the legitimacy of their government and its 
ability to manage important aspects of governance. It can force the government to 
spend time, political capital, and money to investigate how the attack happened and 
how to prevent such an attack from happening again. Note that all of these things are 
true about conventional terrorist attacks. Whether it is terrorists who wish to blow up 
an airplane or individuals who attack civilians, the government response is similar.  
CONCLUSION 
Determining that what I have called new terrorism—such as Russian interference 
in U.S. elections and attacks on critical infrastructure in Europe—constitutes 
terrorism under the FTO statute would represent a moderate middle ground between 
two poles. On one end are those who argue that this activity is different in kind from 
the kinds of activity that designated organizations typically engage in. Following 
from this is the conclusion that the appropriate response is a criminal law response 
that attempts to identify specific wrongful acts and target discrete actors. On the other 
pole are those who argue that such activity amounts to an act of war, suggesting a 
much broader—and potentially more lethal—set of responses.  
The approach I suggest represents a pragmatic middle ground. By designating the 
organizations that engage in such activity, the Secretary of State would be giving 
prosecutors an enhanced set of tools to target the organization for what it has done 
and address what it is likely to do in the future if not stopped. Contrast this to the 
criminal law response, which is almost entirely reactive and backward-looking. To 
be sure, law enforcement is always aiming to prevent crimes. But designating an 
organization is designed to augment the ordinary prevention tools by making it 
possible for the government to target those who assist the organization in any way. 
Designation has the effect of depriving the organization of labor and money, its most 
important assets, before there is a direct link to a specific future terrorist act.  
Treating election interference and social manipulation as a full-fledged attack, as 
many have suggested, is unnecessary and would likely be counterproductive. The 
harms associated with such activity, as serious as they are, are not sufficient to justify 
an armed response. And cyber responses, like hacking back or employing similar 
means, are inherently problematic. They almost always occur secretly and become 
known to the public only much later, if at all. This reduces the possible deterrent 
effect. Such responses also run the risk of harming civilians. It is almost impossible 
to mount a cyber response without targeting civilian or dual-use infrastructure or 
institutions. Not only would this violate bedrock principles of the law of armed 
conflict and U.S. policy, it is also likely to be counterproductive by apparently 
justifying the original wrongdoer's actions.  
 
 
